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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper reviews the economic models explaining the directions of 
technical  change.  The  application  to  agricultural  sector  is  also 
explored.  The  induced  innovation  model  extensively  used  in 
agricultural development studies has left unexplained stylized facts in 
several empirical evidences. This leads to the motivation of this paper 
to  find  an  alternative  model.  While  the  induced  innovation  relies 
heavily  on  the  change  of  relative  factor  price  on  biased  technical 
change, the directed technical change model developed by Acemoglu 
(2002, 2007, 2009) endogenizes investment on research and explains 
the  incentives  of  technology  monopolists.  The  directed  technical 
change model is developed and applied to agricultural sector. Given a 
hypothetical situation of increasing relative scarce agricultural labor, 
the model provides insights of which the policy direction for technical 
change in agricultural sector can be expected. 
 
Keywords:  directed technical change, induced innovation 
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1. Introduction 
 
Understanding the process of technical change has several important 
implications  for  economic  growth  and  performance.    While  the 
process  of technical  change is complex, the economic theories  and 
models of technical change were often oversimplified and may fail to 
capture the true essence of the inspiration.  There has been a long 
history of development in economic theories and modeling to provide 
a better understanding of the process of technical change and relate it 
to  market  structure  and  economic  policy.  On  the  one  hand, 
endogenous  technical  change  models  identify  the  determinants  of 
technical  change  by  embedding  research  efforts  such  as  research 
expenditures  and  human  capital  into  the  model.    The  aggregate 
endogenous  technical  change  models  identify  potential  innovations 
and  provide  a  better  understanding  of  the  sources  and  rates  of 
innovation; however, the question of the direction or bias of technical 
change  could  not  be  explained  by  aggregate  endogenous  technical 
change models.   Because stakeholders in different input industries 
receive  different  benefits  depending  on  the  direction  of  technical 
change, understanding the directed or bias technical change models, 
on the other hand, is essential in determining choices of technology, 
appropriate  distribution  of  income,  and  allocation  of  resources  to 
interested stakeholders.   
 
Numerous  developments  in  economic  theories  of  technical  change 
have  focused  on  industrial  sectors,  but  little  has  been  applied  to 
agricultural  sectors.  Because  of  its  complexity,  rationalizing  the 
process  of  technical  change  in  industrial  sectors  is  not  necessarily 
appropriate for the agricultural sector. The studies of technical change 
in agriculture have concentrated on empirical modeling and estimation 
of the aggregate intensities and impacts of technical change; whereas 
much  less  work  has  been  done  on  the  study  of  the  direction  of   2 
technical  change.    The  most  prominent  theory  of  the  direction  of 
technical  change,  particularly  applied  to  agricultural  sector,  is  the 
“Induced Innovation” hypothesis.  Although the induced innovation 
hypothesis simplifies the complexity of agricultural development, it 
left several unexplained stylized facts that require more appropriate 
economic  theory.    The  motivation  of  this  paper  is  to  propose  an 
alternative economic theory that could better explain the direction of 
technical change in agriculture.  This paper will be divided into three 
sections. First, an overview of the previous development of induced 
innovation  models  is  briefly  discussed  with  the  emphasis  on 
agricultural sector evidences, and the reason why there is a need to 
find more appropriate models for the direction of technical change in 
agricultural  development.  Second,  Acemoglu’s  “Directed  Technical 
Change” model is explained as an alternative to explain the direction 
of technical change. And last, a hypothetical illustration of directed 
technical change model is illustrated for the agricultural sector.  
 
2. The Induced Innovation Theory 
 
The concept of induced innovation model derived from Hick’s Theory 
of Wages. […a change in the relative price of the factors of production 
is itself a spur to invention, and to invention of a particular kind—
directed  to  economize  the  use  of  the  factor  which  has  become 
relatively expensive…invention which are the result of a change in the 
relative prices of the factors; let us call these “induced” inventions…] 
(Hicks  1932,  p. 124-125).   […If we  concentrate on two  groups of 
factors, “labor” and “capital”, and suppose them to exhaust the list, 
then we can classify inventions according as their initial effects are to 
increase,  leave  unchanged,  or  diminish  the  ratio  of  the  marginal 
product  of  capital  to  that  of  labor.    We  may  call  these  inventions 
“labor-saving,” “neutral,” and “capital-saving” respectively.  “Labor-
saving” intentions increase the marginal product of capital more than   3 
they  increase  the  marginal  product  of  labor;  “capital-saving” 
inventions increase the marginal product of labor more than that of 
capital; “neutral” inventions increase both in the same proportion…] 
(Hicks 1932, p. 121-122)   
 
Kennedy (1964) introduced the induced technical change model to the 
literature  by  suggesting  the  Innovation  Possibility  Function  (IPF). 
What drives the innovation is not the change in relative factor prices, 
but  the  relative  factor  shares.    Labor-saving  innovations  are 
competitive  with  capital-saving  reduction  in  a  typical  two-factor 
production model.  The greater the reduction in the labor required to 
produce a unit of output, the smaller will be the possible reduction in 
capital required (Kennedy, 1964).  The IPF between capital and labor 
specifies the set of potential instantaneous rates of factor augmentation 
at a given state of knowledge. The greater the share of labor costs in 
total  costs,  the  more  labor-saving  innovations  are  chosen  by  the 
entrepreneurs.   The concave shape and the concept of IPF are similar 
to the Production Possibility Function (PPF), except that it has two 
advantages.  First, the IPF has a dynamic sense of the possibilities to 
innovate rather than a static technology of the production function.  
Secondly, the characteristics of IPF determine the biased innovations 
reflected from the distributive shares of factors or the weights of cost-
saving shares.  However, the IPF did not explain how much a fall in 
labor  requirements  has  been  brought  about  by  a  labor-saving 
innovation rather than a substitution of cheaper capital for labor, and 
unable to take increasing returns  and monopolistic production.  The 
macro perspective of IPF, as criticized by Binswanger (1974b), was 
difficult  for  empirical  analysis  due  to  measurement  of  factor 
augmentation rates.  
 
Samuelson  (1965)  adopted  the  factor  augmenting  model  in 
neoclassical production and expanded the Kennedy IPF model. In a   4 
long-run  equilibrium  model,  as  long  as  labor  and  capital  are  not 
perfectly  substitutable  (elasticity  of  substitution  less  than  1),  an 
increase  in  labor  share  from  capital  accumulation,  will  make  it 
profitable to introduce relatively more labor-augmenting innovations.  
A long-run equilibrium is led by induced relatively labor-augmenting 
or  labor-saving  inventions  to  keep  a  constant  capital/labor  ratio.  
However, if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one, which will 
cause  an  unstable  long-run  equilibrium,  the  model  shows  that  a 
research  effort  is  simply to  reduce  the  cost  of  production,  with  no 
implied bias of innovation.   
 
Ahmad  (1966)  interpreted  Kennedy’s  IPF  by  characterizing  each 
innovation  by  a  set  of  isoquants  (corresponding  to  a  particular 
production function), where labor and capital are represented on the 
two  axes.  Innovation  possibility  curve  (IPC),  in  his  analysis,  is  an 
envelope  of  all the  alternative isoquants developed with the use of 
given innovating skills and time.  An increase in a relative wage to 
price of capital will first encourage a substitution of capital for labor (a 
switch of isoquants representing particular production functions along 
IPC), and will further induce an innovation of labor-saving technology 
(a shift of IPC). The IPC in his analysis is purely technological or 
laboratory question, and the economic consideration would come from 
choosing a particular isoquant out of various isoquants belonging to a 
particular IPC.  The IPC did not add further explanation of reasons of 
the movement from old IPC to new IPC, except for the relative change 
in factor prices. 
 
The Induced Innovation theory has been widely used as a model to 
analyze a biased technical change in agriculture.  Hayami and Ruttan 
(1970) were first to analyze the induced innovation hypothesis by a 
comparative study of technical progress between Japan and the U.S. 
during  1980-1960.    A  decrease  in  a  relative  price  of  land  and   5 
machinery to wages in U.S. agriculture promoted a substitution of land 
and power for labor and also encouraged mechanical innovations. It 
was observed by a substantial increase in land and power to labor ratio 
which would have been a limited substitution with a fixed technology.  
While an inelastic supply of land in Japan and a decrease in relative 
price  of  fertilizer  to  price  of  land  led  to  a  significant  increase  in 
fertilizer input per crop area, it was not only because of a substitution 
of fertilizer for land, but also biological innovations such as improved 
seed varieties that are more responsive to fertilizer.  A change in factor 
ratio  in  response  to  changes  in  relative  factor  prices  represented  a 
movement  along  the  ‘metaproduction  function’  or  ‘potential 
production function’ similar to the IPC proposed by Ahmad.  In their 
framework, the innovation of a new technology is represented by a 
movement alone the IPC instead of a shift of IPC itself, presumably 
because  the  elasticities  of  substitution  between  factors  were  small 
given  fixed  technology.  The  observed  substantial  changes  in  factor 
ratios in response to long-term relative factor prices would not have 
occurred with a fixed technology.  
 
Simple  regressions  of  factor  ratios  on  relative  factor  prices, 
emphasized  that  it  was  not  an  attempt  to  test  induced  innovation 
hypothesis, show a strong negative correlation between factor ratios 
and  relative  factor  prices  consistent  with  the  induced  innovation 
hypothesis in US and Japan agricultural development.  Their results 
found  a  strong  evidence  of  the  induced  innovation  hypothesis  that 
countries developed a technology in response to market price signals 
to  relax  constraints  on  growth  imposed  by  factor  scarcities.  One 
important  observation  was  that  not  all  mechanical  (biological) 
innovations were motivated by labor (land) -saving incentives.  For 
example,  the  improved  varieties  more  suitable  for  mechanical 
harvesting  were  a  biological  innovation  to  save  labor.  Their 
framework  later  developed  into  a  broader  study  of  agricultural   6 
development  in  Western  and  Asian  countries  (Hayami  and  Ruttan, 
1985). 
 
Although  the  induced  innovation  hypothesis  provided  a  simple 
framework of the direction of technological change, it failed to explain 
several empirical evidences. As pointed out by Olmstead and Rhode 
(1993),  the  evidences  of  what  appeared  to  be  consistent  with  the 
induced innovation hypothesis by Hayami and Ruttan (1970, 1985) in 
U.S. agriculture were in fact contradict to it.  More updated and more 
accurate  relative  factor  prices  and  factor  ratios  data  when  the 
technologies  were  developed  in  various  U.S.  regions  explained 
different  observations  than  what  the  induced  innovation  hypothesis 
would suggest.  
 
Binswanger (1974a) criticized the induced innovation hypothesis for 
two main reasons: the difficulty to empirically test the hypothesis and 
the lack of microeconomic foundation.  He provided a microeconomic 
model  of  innovation  possibilities  on  the  basis  of  research  process, 
which  has  expected  pay-off  functions  in  terms  of  efficiency 
improvements, and introduces research costs. In this model, the bias of 
innovation was determined by 1) relative productivities of alternative 
researches e.g. possibility of success invention, 2) relative prices of 
researches e.g. price of capital-saving research to price of labor-saving 
research, 3) anything that changes the present value of factor cost e.g. 
an increase in a factor price or a factor/output ratio tends to increase 
relative bias in that factor-saving technology. 
 
Binswanger (1974b) further developed an econometric model of a cost 
minimization approach to measure a bias technical change, allowing 
for many factors of production.  His definition of bias was slightly 
different  from  Hick’s  definition.    Hick’s  bias  definition  could  be 
expressed in terms of a change in the elasticity of substitution (a ratio   7 
of marginal products) for a given factor ratio; whereas, Binswanger’s 
definition of bias technical change was given in terms of a change in 
factor shares (of total cost).  Based on U.S. agricultural data during 
1912-1968,  a  five-input  model  of  cost  minimization  was  used  to 
estimate  a  bias  technical  change.    The  bias  calculated  from  an 
estimated  change  of  factor  shares  over  time  showed  that  technical 
changes  in  U.S.  agricultural  production  was  biased  towards 
machinery-  and  fertilizer-using,  and  labor-saving.    The  result  of 
fertilizer-using was consistent with the induced innovation hypothesis 
as  it  was  accompanied  by  a  dramatic  decrease  in  fertilizer  price 
relative  to  price  of  agricultural  outputs.    Similarly,  labor-saving 
technical  change  followed  an  increase  in  farm  wages.  However,  a 
machinery-using  direction  contradicted  to  the  induced  innovation 
hypothesis  as  the  machinery  price  was  increasing  over  that  time 
period. He explained that the direction of technical change responded 
only to a massive change in relative prices. 
 
The most recent attempt to provide a microeconomic foundation to 
induced innovation hypothesis was done by Funk (2002).  He assumed 
that  for  given  factor  prices,  firms  maximize  a  profit  subject  to  the 
innovation possibilities.  For a two-factor, capital and labor, model, the 
innovation possibility frontier is the set of possible pairs of the rates of 
factor augmentation from which firms can choose given the state of 
knowledge.  The higher the chosen rate of labor augmentation, the 
smaller  is  the  rate  of  capital  augmentation,  and  vice  versa.    He 
provided both discrete and continuous time models.  In the dynamic 
behavior of macro variables, it follows from the induced innovation 
hypothesis that the higher labor share in total income, the higher is the 
chosen rate of labor augmentation and the smaller is the chosen rate of 
capital augmentation.  In a microeconomic model, the optimal rate of 
labor  and  capital  augmentation  depends  on  relative  factor  prices   8 
although it can also be expressed in terms of aggregate factor shares 
(as factor prices depend on aggregate quantities).    
 
So what is wrong with the induced innovation hypothesis? The main 
challenges of the induced innovation hypothesis center on two main 
criticisms.  First,  there  is  a  lack  of  microeconomic  foundation.  
Binswanger (1974a, 1974b), Binswanger and Ruttan (1978) and Funk 
(2002) attempted to response to this criticism.  These microeconomic 
models were developed on the basis of cost minimizing (Binswanger, 
1974a, 1974b;  Binswanger  and Ruttan, 1978) or profit maximizing 
(Funk,  2002)  behaviors  of  firms  that  the  bias  of  technical  change 
depends principally on relative factor prices.  The models have been 
used for several empirical analyses which lead to the second criticism 
that  sometimes  empirical  evidences  do  not  support  the  induced 
innovation  hypothesis.    Earlier  empirical  evidences  supporting  the 
hypothesis include Antle (1984), Fellner (1971), Hayami and Ruttan 
(1970, 1985), Karagiannis and Furtan (2008), Kawagoe et al. (1986), 
Lambert and Schonkwiler (1995), Thirtle et al. (1995) and Thirtle et 
al.  (2002).    These  earlier  supporting  empirical  evidences  of  the 
induced  innovation  hypothesis  were  often  criticized  for  inadequate 
data and inappropriate statistical methods which were corrected and 
improved by later studies.  However, there remain other studies that 
found  unsupportive  evidences  (Esposti  and  Pierani,  2003;  Liu  and 
Shumway,  2009;  Machado,  1995;  Olmstead  and  Rhode,  1993), 
uncertain cases (Armanville and Funk, 2003; Chavas et al., 1997; Liu 
and Shumpway, 2006; Tiffin and Dawson, 1995) or reverse causality 
(Khatri  et  al.,  1998)  of  the  induced  innovation  hypothesis.  These 
unexplained determinants of the direction of technical change demand 
other  models  to  explain  the  bias  of  technical  change.    In  the  next 
section, I propose the directed technical change model developed by 
Acemoglu (2002, 2007, 2009) as an alternative theory. 
     9 
3. The Directed Technical Change Model 
 
Since  the  introduction  of  the  directed  technical  change  model  by 
Acemoglu  (2002),  several  studies  have  applied  it  to  explain  skill-
biased  technical  change  and  wage  inequality  (Afono,  2006,  2008; 
Cozzi  and  Impullitti,  2010;  Foellmi  and  Zweimüller,  2006;  Weiss, 
2009)  and  recently  on  energy-saving  technical  change  and  carbon 
emissions (Carraro et al., 2009; Gillingham et al., 2008; Grimaud and 
Rouge, 2008; Otto et al., 2008) particularly in the aggregate growth 
model.  This model has not been applied to the agricultural sector, and 
could  provide  a  better  understanding  of  the  direction  of  technical 
change that the induced innovation theory could not. Building upon 
Acemoglu’s directed technical change model (Acemoglu, 2002, 2007, 
2009), I will show the application of this model in the context of the 
agricultural economy. 
 
3.1 Defining Relative Bias 
 
The focus of this paper is on the relative equilibrium bias of technical 
change.    It  is  different  from  factor  augmented  technical  change  in 
general  endogenous  growth  models.    To  understand  the  distinction 
between  factor  augmentation  and  factor  bias,  let’s  first  look  at  the 
definitions  of  the  two.    A  technical  change  is  (everywhere)  A-
augmenting if the production function can be written as F(aA, L) while 
F(A, aL) corresponds to a L-augmenting technical change (Acemoglu, 
2009).  On the other hand, the relative equilibrium bias of technology 
is defined as the impact of technology on relative factor prices at given 
factor proportions (Acemoglu, 2007).  Consider the agricultural sector 
consists of constant supplies of two factors: land (A) and labor (L), 
denoted  by  + ∈R A and  + ∈R L ,  respectively.  Their  corresponding 
equilibrium factor prices are denoted by ωA and ωL. The agricultural   10 
production function of aggregate final output (Y) employing A and L 
is given as 
 
  ( ) a   L,   A, F     Y = .            (1) 
 
where  + ∈R t a ) ( represents technology. The technology is A-biased if it 
increases the relative marginal product of land compared to that of 
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In contrast, the reverse inequality corresponds to a L-biased technical 
change. A biased technical change towards a particular factor will shift 
that factor demand curve outward; thus, for given factor proportions 
(relative factor quantities) its relative factor price will increase. 
 
3.2 Defining Weak and Strong Relative Biases 
 
The relative equilibrium biases can be classified into two types: weak 
relative  equilibrium  bias  and  strong  relative  equilibrium  bias.    To 
illustrate the difference between them, consider the example of CES 
production function given as 
 













 + = . 
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where aL and aA are separate technology factors specific to each factor, 
and γL  and γA are weighted parameters determining the importance of 
labor  and  land  in  the  production  function,  and  γL  +  γA  =  1.  The 
elasticity of substitution between two factors is σ ∈ [0, ∞].  Note that 
given the CES production function, two factors are perfect substitutes 
when σ = ∞.  When there is no substitution between two factors, σ = 
0,  the  production  function  is  Leontief.    For  a  unit  elasticity  of 
substitution, σ = 1, the function is Cobb-Douglas.  Specifically to CES 
function, the two inputs are gross substitutes when σ > 1, and they are 
gross complements when σ < 1. 
 
A technical change is weak relative biased when an increase in the 
relative factor supply induces a technical change biased towards the 
relatively  more  abundant  factor.    For  example,  a  decrease  in  the 
relative supply of agricultural labor or equivalently an increase in the 
relative supply of land, A/L, induces the A-biased technical change.  It 
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When an increase in the relative  factor supply  induces a sufficient 
large  bias  towards  the  relative  more  abundant  factor  so  that  the 
marginal product of the more abundant factor relative to that of less 
abundant  factor  increases,  the  technical  change  is  strong  relative 
biased. For example, an increase in A/L induces a sufficient large A-
biased technical change so that MPA relative to MPL increases. It is 
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In equilibrium BGP (balance growth path), the relative factor price 
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The strong equilibrium bias means, in other words, when an increase 
in a relatively abundant factor induces a bias in technical change that 
increases the relative price of the more abundant factor so that the 
endogenous-technology relative factor demand curve becomes upward 
sloping. 
 
3.3  Demand  for  Technology  (machineries  and  fertilizers/seed 
varieties) 
 
The final aggregate agricultural output, Y, consists of two intermediate 
outputs: YA , land-intensive output, and YL, labor-intensive output.  To 















 + = ,        (2) 
 
where  ε  ∈[0,  ∞]  is  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  two 
intermediate outputs, and γ∈[0, 1] is the distribution parameter which 
determines  how  important  the  two  outputs  are  in  the  aggregate 
production.  The two intermediate outputs are produced competitively 
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where β∈ [0,1], L and A are total supplies of labor and land, ν ∈ [0, N] 
is  a  variety  of  technology,  and ) ( xL ν and  ) ( xA ν are  quantities  of 
corresponding complementary intermediates. Thus, the labor-intensive 
output is produced from labor and a range of labor-complementing 
inputs. I will refer to s )' ( xL ν as quantity of machineries.  Likewise, 
land-intensive  output  is  produced  from  land  and  a  range  of  land-
complementing inputs. I will refer to s )' ( xA ν as quantity of fertilizers 
(or seed varieties).  A range of machineries that can be used by labor is 
[0, NL] while a range of fertilizers (or seed varieties) complementing 
the use of land is [0, NA].   
 
It  is  assumed  that  the  new  innovation  of  technology  variety  ν    is 
supplied  by  a  technology  monopolist  who  sets  the  price  of  the 
technology  variety.    A  technical  change  can  be  interpreted  as  the 
increase in innovation ranges of complementary intermediates, NA and 
NL,  supplied  by  technology  monopolists  who  set  the  prices  of 
machineries, ) ( p
x
L ν ,  and  the  prices  of  fertilizers  (or  seed 
varieties), ) ( p
x
A ν .    As  we  will  see  later  the  difference  in  factor-
complementing  inputs  used  in  the  production  of  two  intermediate 
outputs allows for a biased technical change.  
 
The producers of two intermediate outputs maximize their profits.  For 
a given price of labor-intensive output, L p , rental price of machineries, 
(νν p
x
L ,  and  the  range  of  machineries,  NL,  the  profit  maximization 
problem of labor-intensive output producers can be written as 
   14 
  ∫ − −
∈
L





L L L L )] ( [x L, ) ( x ) ( p L ω Y p max ν ν ν
ν ν d .    (5) 
 
Substituting  production  function  of  labor-intensive  output  from  (3) 
into (5) gives 
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The profit maximization problem of land-intensive output producers is 
similarly expressed as 
 
  ∫ − −
∈
A
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ν ν d .    (6) 
 
The substitution of (4) into (6) gives 
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where  A p is the price of land-intensive output,  ) ( p
x
A ν  is the price of 
fertilizers  (or  seed  varieties),  and  the  range  of  fertilizers  (or  seed 
varieties)  is  NA.    The  first  order  conditions  for  the  maximization 
problems of intermediate output producers give the quantity demand 


















ν , for all  ] N [0, ν L ∈ ,      (7)   15 


















, for all  ] N [0, ν A ∈ .    (8) 
 
As  the  price  of  labor-intensive  output  increases,  there  is  a  higher 
demand for labor-complementary input.  The higher the product price 
is,  the  higher  are  the  values  of  marginal  products  of  all  factors, 
including  that  of  machineries;  thus  producers  demand  more 
machineries in their labor-intensive production.  The increase in labor 
employment  increases  the  demand  for  machineries  as  they  are 
complementary  inputs,  but  the  price  of  machineries  decreases  the 
demand  for  machineries.    By  the  same  token,  the  demand  for 
fertilizers  or  seed  varieties  increases  as  the  price  of  land-intensive 
output and land use increase, but decreases as land rent increases. 
 
By substituting the derived demands for labor and land in (7) and (8) 
into the production function of intermediate outputs given in (3) and 
(4), the derived production functions are written as: 
 
  L N p
β 1
1





=  , and          (9) 
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= .          (10) 
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p ≡  be the relative price of intermediate outputs. Given the 
aggregate final output production in (2), the market clearing condition 
of competitive intermediate output markets imply that the prices of 






























= .          (11) 
 
This implies that the higher the supply of land relative to the supply of 
labor, the lower is the relative rental price of land to wage rate.  The 
response of relative prices to the relative supplies of inputs depends on 
the elasticity of substitution between two intermediate outputs. 
 




























































= ,          (12)   
 
where  β 1) (ε 1 β) 1)(1 (ε ε σ − + = − − − ≡   ,  and  0 σ ≥ is  the  derived 
elasticity of substitution between land and labor.  Two inputs are gross 
substitutes if σ > 1, and σ = 0 implies no substitutability between the 
two. This says that σ > 1 if and only if ε >1; thus, land and labor are   17 
gross  substitutes  if  and  only  if  land-intensive  output,  and  labor-
intensive output are gross substitutes.   
In equilibrium, the first order conditions of maximization problems of 
the intermediate output producers with respect to L and A provide the 












































= ∫ ν ν d ) ( A .      (14) 
 
Define relative factor prices as rental price of land compared to wage 





ω ≡ .    Similar  to  the  intermediate  output  markets,  the 
market clearing price of a factor is equal to its marginal product.  The 
relative  marginal  products  of  land  to  labor  using  the  definition  of 
intermediate output production functions in (2) and (3) provide relative 








p ω = .             (15) 
 








































= .        (16) 
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We could see from (16) that the elasticity of substitution between land 





















− = . 
 
The last term on the right hand side of (16) implies that an increase in 
relative supply of land to labor always lowers the relative rental price 
of land to wage rate, this can be interpreted as a standard substitution 
effect.  The ratio of  ( ) L A/N N in (16) is called the relative physical 
productivity  of  the  two  factors  or  the  ratio  of  factor-augmenting 
technologies.  The relative wage, however, does not depend on just the 




.    The 
impact  of  an  increase  in  ( ) L A/N N on  the  direction  of  change  in 
( ) L A/ω ω  depends on σ.  When two factors are gross substitutes: σ > 1, 
an increase in ( ) L A/N N increases ( ) L A/ω ω . On the contrary, when two 
factors  are  gross  complements:  σ  <  1,  an  increase  in  ( ) L A/N N  
decreases ( ) L A/ω ω . 
 
3.5 Relative Profits: Price Effect and Market Effect 
 
Assuming  that  the  marginal  cost  of  producing  all  machineries  and 
fertilizers/seed varieties is the same, and equals to ψ. The technology 
monopolists maximize their profit of producing labor-complementing 
machinery ν, which can be written as  
 
  ( ) ) ( x   ψ ) ( p ) ( π L
x
L L ν ν ν − = .          (17)   19 
 
The profit of a monopolist producing land-complementing fertilizers 
or seed varieties can be written in the same fashion as 
 
  ( ) ) ( x   ψ) ) ( p ) ( π A
x
A A ν ν ν − = .        (18) 
 
The  price  of  technology  monopolists  set  a  constant  markup  over 
marginal  cost  given  the  constant  elasticity  demand  curve  for 








.  By  normalizing  the  marginal  cost  to  simplify  the 
analysis,  β 1 ψ − ≡ ,  equilibrium  prices  of  all  machineries  and 
fertilizers/seed  varieties  are  equal  to  ) ( p
x
L ν = ) ( p
x
A ν =  1  for  all  ν.  
Taking the demands derived in (7) and (8) and normalized marginal 
costs and prices of technology varieties, the profit in (17) and (18) can 
now be written as  
 
  L ) ( βp (νν π
/β 1
L L ν = , and          (19) 
 
  A ) ( βp (νν π
/β 1
A A ν = .           (20) 
 
From (19) and (20), the profits of monopolists depend only on the 
sector of technology there are supplying.  To compare the  relative 
                                                 
1 To simplify the illustration, normalizing pL to 1. The maximization of labor-
intensive output producer becomes 
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− − =  which gives the first order 
condition as  ) 1 /( ) ( β ψ ν − =
x
L p .   20 
profits  of  the  two  sectors,  the  relative  profit  of  monopolists  in 
fertilizers- and seed varieties- producing sector to that of monopolists 




effect   size market 
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= .        (21) 
 
The first term on the right hand side of (21) is called a price effect, and 
the  second  term  is  called  a  market  size  effect.    The  price  effect 
suggests more incentives to invent technology complementing scarce 
inputs because the price of output that is produced intensively from 
scarcer input is relatively more expensive. Intuitively the price effect 
gives more incentives to develop technology when goods produced by 
these technology command higher price while the market size effect 
makes technology that has a larger market more profitable. 
 
An increase in relative supply of inputs generates two opposing effects 
on relative profits.  When there is an increase in relative land to labor 
(A/L), its relative price  ) /p (p L A decreases.  Thus,  while the market 
size effect increases relative profit  ) /π (π L A from an increase in (A/L), 
the price effect from a decline in  ) /p (p L A decreases it.   Whether there 
will be more incentive to develop land-complementing technology or 
labor-complementing  technology  depends  on  these  two  opposing 
effects.  The larger the profit from fertilizers and seed variety sector 
relative to profit from machineries sector, the higher are the incentives 
to  develop  land-complementing  technology,  NA,  than  labor-
complementing technology, NL.  
 
To illustrate the effects of relative prices and the market size on the 
relative profits, substituting the relative intermediate output prices in   21 
(12)  into  (21)  gives  the  relative  profits  of  technology  monopolists 










































= .        (22) 
 
If σ   > 1, an increase in  (A/L)increases ) /π (π L A .  When factors are 
gross substitutes, the market effect dominates the price effect so that 
there  are  more  incentives  to  improve  the  productivity  of  abundant 
factor.  In contrast, when factors are gross complements, σ  < 1, the 
price effect dominates the market size effect, and there will be more 
incentives to improve the productivity of scarce factor. 
 
3.6 Endogenous Directed Technical Change 
 
Aside from factor supplies, the endogenous technical change takes into 
account other factors determining the supply of technology.  On the 
supply  side  of  technology,  the  incentives  for  developing  new 
technology  determine  the  directions  of  technical  change.    The 
production  of  new  innovations  is  constrained  by  the  innovation 
possibility  frontier, which was introduced by  Kennedy  (1964) as  a 
relationship between two new technologies that reduce the cost shares 
of two inputs.  Consider two endogenous technical change models: lab 
equipment  model  and  knowledge-driven  model  (Rivera-Baltiz  and 
Romer, 1991.  The lab equipment model requires only the final goods 
as  inputs,  and  there  is  no  knowledge  spillover  of  past  research  to 
current productivity for sustainable growth).  The knowledge-driven 
model, on the other hand, uses scarce input (labor) for research and 
development.  Thus, sustainable growth requires that scarce factors’ 
productivity increases so that marginal productivity does not decline   22 
and  there  will  be  a  knowledge  spillover  from  previous  research 
(Acemoglu, 2002). 
 
Allowing the costs of developing different technology to be different, 
consider first the lab equipment model of technology development.  
The specification of the lab equipment model is given as 
 
  L L L R η N = ɺ  and  A A A R η N = ɺ ,        (23) 
 
where  L η and  A η >  0,  and L N ɺ and  A N ɺ 2
  are  the  growths  in  new 
varieties of machinery and fertilizers/seed varieties, respectively.  The 
growth of new machinery varieties depends on the R&D spending (in 
terms of labor-intensive output) on developing labor-complementary 
machineries,  L R . The growth of new fertilizers/seed varieties depends 
on  the  R&D  spending  (in  terms  of  land-intensive  output)  on 
developing  land-complementary  fertilizers/seed  varieties,  A R .  
L η represents  marginal  incremental  change  in  new  innovations  of 
machineries from one unit of R&D spending directed at discovering 
new machineries, and also one unit of R&D spending on developing 
fertilizers/seed varieties gives A η new varieties of fertilizers and seed. 
The difference in  L η and  A η implies that the cost of inventing two 
types of technology may be different.  Equation (23) can be considered 
as the innovation possibilities in the context of this model. 
 
Since there is no knowledge spillover or zero state dependence, it is 
found from (23) that  ( ) ( ) L A L L A A /η η R / N / R / N = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ɺ ɺ .  The ratio of 
marginal  changes  in  new  varieties  of  two  types  of  technologies  is 
                                                 
2 Simplifying the notation without lost of generosity of time derivative, 
dt t dN t N / ) ( ) ( ≡ ɺ .   23 
independent  of  the  levels  of  A N ɺ and L N ɺ .    In  the  steady  state 
equilibrium,  prices  of  both  intermediate  outputs,  L p and A p ,  are 
constant; the ratio of profits  ( ) L A/π π is constant and equal to( ) A L/η η .  
This  implies  that  the  technology  monopolists  in  machineries  and 
fertilizers/seed sectors have incentives to innovate in both sectors.  The 
market clearing condition in the technology market is as follows 
 
  L L A A π /η π η .            (24) 
 
As long as there are possibilities for innovations in both technology 
sectors,  A N ɺ and L N ɺ >  0,  it  is  equally  profitable  to  invest  in  R&D 
directed at labor- and land- complementary technologies.  Substituting 
the monopolists’ technology  profits in  (19) and  (20) in the market 
clearing condition (24), and using relative intermediate output prices 
in  (12),  we  can  solve  for  the  relative  physical  productivity  of 






































=         (25) 
 
The endogenous technical change in (25) suggests that the relative bias 
of technology, a change in relative physical productivities ( ) L A/N N , is 
determined by the relative supply of factors(A/L),  and the elasticity 
of  substitution  between  two  factors,  σ.    Recall  from  (16)  that  the 
direction of change in( ) L A/ω ω  depends also on ( ) L A/N N . 
 
The impact of relative factor supplies on relative profits and relative 
factor  prices  depend  on  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  two 
factors.  To see whether the elasticity of substitution between factors   24 
influences  the  weak  and  strong  biased  technical  change,  consider 
endogenous lab equipment technical change model.  From (25), if σ  > 
1,  an  increase  in  (A/L)increases( ) L A/N N ;  an  increase  in  relative 
factor supplies will increase the relative physical productivity of more 
abundant  factor.    As  (16)  suggests  when  σ    >  1,  an  increase  in 
( ) L A/N N  will increase  ( ) L A/ω ω .  Thus, when two factors are gross 
substitutes, the endogenous technical change is biased towards more 
abundant  factor.  When  σ    <  1,  (25)  suggests  that  an  increase  in 
(A/L)will decrease( ) L A/N N .  However, a decrease in  ( ) L A/N N  will 
increase( ) L A/ω ω  when σ  < 1 as suggested in (16). Thus, when two 
factors are gross complements, technical change is also biased in favor 
of relative more abundant factor.  As long as the production function is 
not  Cobb-Douglas  (when  σ    =  1),  an  increase  in  relative  more 
abundant factor always endogenously biased in favor of relative more 
abundant  factor;  this  is  the  weak  induced-bias  hypothesis  of 
endogenous directed technical change model. 
 






































= .        (26) 
 
By  allowing  ( ) L A/N N   to  adjust  when  (A/L)  changes  in  the 
endogenous technical change model, the response of relative factor 
prices to a change in (A/L)in (26) is greater than that in (16)
3
.  From 
(26), an increase in  (A/L) will increase  ( ) L A/ω ω  when σ  > 2.  As 
defined earlier, the strong induced-bias hypothesis states that when the 
                                                 
3 σ-2 > -1/σ   25 
elasticity  between  two  factors  are  sufficiently  large,  an  increase  in 
relative abundant factor will increase relative price of more abundant 
factor,  or  an  upward  sloping  factor  demand  curve.    In  this  model, 
when  σ  >  2,  there  is  a  strong  relative  bias  technical  change.  
Intuitively, when the elasticity of substitution between two factors is 
large enough, the market size effect outweighs the price effect and also 
outweighs the normal substitution effect, for a given technology.  
 
In the knowledge-driven model, the future relative costs of innovation, 
which implies the innovation possibilities, are influenced by current 
stage of research and development.  The degree of this dependency is 
captured by state dependence, δ; and  ] 1 , 0 [ δ∈ . Assuming that there are 
constant supplies of scientists devoted to R&D in each technology 
sectors, the production functions of innovations are specified as 
 
  L Z L L L S N N N
2 / ) 1 ( 2 / ) 1 ( δ δ η
− + = ɺ and A A L A A S N N N
2 / ) 1 ( 2 / ) 1 ( δ δ η
+ − = ɺ , (27) 
 
where  SL  and  SA  are  number  of  scientists  conducting  R&D  in 
machineries and fertilizers/seed varieties, respectively.  When δ = 0, 
L A L L A A S N S N η η / ) / /( ) / ( = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ɺ ɺ   and  there  is  no  state  dependence, 
providing similar results to the lab equipment model.   
 
The technology market clearing condition became 
 
  L L L A A A N N π η π η
δ δ = .          (28) 
 
Note that (28) exactly to (24) when δ = 0.  Using (12), (19) and (20), 
the equilibrium relative technology is 













































A .      (29) 
 
In this model, response of relative physical productivities to change in 
relative factor supplies depend not only on σ, but also on δ.  Unless 
there is no state dependency, an increase in  ) / ( L A increases( ) L A N N / ; 
an increase in relative factor supplies will increase the relative physical 
productivity of more abundant factor. There is always a weak relative 




















































A .      (30) 
 
Consider only stable conditions e.g. σ < 1/δ, the direction of changes 
in  relative  factor  prices  from  an  increase  in  ) / ( L A   depends  on 
whether  δ 2 σ − > .  Presuming that  δ 2 σ − > , if δ = 0, an increase in 
) / ( L A   will  increase  ( ) L A ω ω /   when  σ    >  2,  just  like  in  the  lab 
equipment model that the strong relative bias requires elasticity of 
substation between factors to be greater than two.  By contrast, in an 
extreme state dependence when δ = 1 and  δ 2 σ − > , σ > 1 implies σ > 
1/δ, and the system is unstable. An increase in (A/L) will not increase 
( ) L A ω ω /  in the long-run.  There is no strong relative bias when δ = 1. 
As long as  1 δ <  strong relative bias occurs when  δ 2 σ − > .  When 
elasticity  of  substitution  is  large  enough,  the  market  size  effect 
dominates  the  price  effect  and  also  the  substitution  effect  at  given 
technology. Thus the direction of technical change is biased in favor of 
relative more abundant factor.  
   27 
Consider a decrease in relative factor supply, the substitution effect as 
in (16) suggests an increase in relative price of scarcer factor. The 
induced  innovation  hypothesis  implies  that  it  will  induce  the 
development of technology to save relative scarcer input.  The directed 
technical  change,  on  the  contrary,  suggests  that  it  will  induce 
innovations  that  decrease  relative  physical  productivity  of  scarcer 
factor;  in  other  words,  there  will  be  more  innovations  to  increase 
physical productivity of less scarce factor. And if two factors have 
sufficiently large substitutability, the technical change would result in 
a decrease in relative price of scarcer factor. 
 
4. Illustration of Directed Technical Change Model in Agricultural 
Sector 
 
Continuing  from  the  previous  section,  assume  that  the  aggregate 
agricultural output, Y, is produced from two intermediate outputs: YA 
being an aggregate land-intensive output such as grains, cotton, and 
timber, and YL being an aggregate labor-intensive output such as fruits 
and  vegetables.    As  a  country  becomes  more  industrialized,  more 
agricultural labor is moving to the industrial sector; the relative supply 
of agricultural labor to arable land becomes smaller or the land to 
labor ratio becomes larger.  As labor becomes scarcer relative to land, 
the price of labor-intensive commodities relative to the price of land-
intensive commodities increases; in other words,  ) /p (p L A decreases.  
The price effect in (21) suggests that it is less profitable to develop 
new  fertilizers  and  seed  varieties  relative  to  developing  new 
machineries.    Thus,  there  will  be  more  incentives  to  invent  new 
machineries complementing labor-intensive production than inventing 
new fertilizers and seed varieties such as new complementing land-
intensive  production.  The  price  effect  favors  the  technology 
complementing the scarce factor—machinery. The market size effect 
in  (21),  on  the  other  hand,  favors  the  technology  complementing   28 
abundant inputs.  As land becomes more abundant relative to labor, 
there is higher relative utilization of land to labor employment.  The 
demand for fertilizers and seed varieties is expanding more rapidly 
than the demand for machineries; as a result, there are more incentives 
to invent new fertilizers and seed varieties.  
 
Suppose  that  land  and  labor  are  gross  complements  (σ  <  1)  in 
agricultural production, (22) suggests that the price effect dominates 
the market size effect, and there will be more incentives to develop 
new machineries such as harvesters and seeding machines than new 
fertilizers and seed varieties.  As the relative arable land to agricultural 
labor  increases  in  this  example,  the  endogenous  directed  technical 
change model, e.g. in (25), proposes that the number of innovations in 
machineries relative to the number of innovations in fertilizers and 
seed varieties  ( ) A L N N /  will increase in the long-run.  Because land 
and labor are assumed to be complements, the relative rental price of 
land to wage rate will increase, e.g. in (16), and we will observe a 
weak relative biased towards land—a more abundant factor--induced 
by a relative increase in arable land to agricultural labor supply.    
 
From Figure 1, at the initial supply, (A/L)0, and initial demand, DSR, 
relative  land  rent  to  wage  rate  equate  at  (ω Α/ω L)0.    After  an 
exogenous increase in relative agricultural land to labor from (A/L)0 to 
(A/L)1, it will generate a substitution effect in the short-run when there 
is no change in technology (constant  L A N N / ).  The relative rental 
price  of  land  to  wage  rate  will  drop  to  (ω Α/ω L)1.    The  directed 
technical change model suggests that there will be an induced land-
biased technical change—a weak induced bias towards relatively more 
innovations in fertilizers and seed varieties resulting in a higher rental 
price of land to wage rate at (ω Α/ω L)2, compared to without a biased 
technical change (ω Α/ω L)1.     29 
At a larger supply of land to labor than (A/L)0 , an increase in the 
relative land to labor supply will shift the technology demand curve to 
the  right  while  at  a  smaller  supply  than  (A/L)0  ,  it  will  shift  the 
technology demand to the left.  A long-run endogenous technology 
demand curve will shift to DLR1.  This graph suggests that a long-run 
technology demand curve is more elastic than the short-run technology 
demand  curve  (Acemoglu,  2002,  2009),  the  analogy  similar  to 




Figure 1. Short-run and long-run response to an increase in relative land to labor 
supply, assuming land and labor are complements   
Source: Adapted from Acemoglu (2009). 
 
What the directed technical change model suggests in this example, 
when  labor  and  land  are  complements  and  when  agricultural  labor 
becomes  scarcer  relative  to  arable  land,  is  that  we  will  observe  a 
decline  in  relative  land  rent  to  wage  rate,  but  the  degree  of  this   30 
decrease in price ratio will not be as large as if the state of technology 
was held constant.  In the long-run, we will observe more innovations 
of machineries relative to fertilizers and seed varieties. 
 
To compare with the induced innovation theory, Hayami and Ruttan 
(1970) model assumes that land and labor are substitutes in the U.S. 
agricultural production.  A decrease in an agricultural labor to land 
ratio will result in a higher wage rate relative to land rent; thus, induce 
a  labor-saving  technology  such  as  mechanical  innovation.    As 
Olmstead  and  Rhode  (1993)  criticized  the  induced  innovation 
evidence of Hayami and Ruttan (1970) that the price of land to wage 
rate in the U.S. during that period was rising instead of falling, the 
directed technical change model, when assumes that land and labor are 
substitutes,  could suggest an increase in land rent relative to  wage 
rate—a strong relative bias if the elasticity of substitution between the 




Because  the  direction  of  technical  change  is  favorable  to  certain 
groups of stakeholders and not the others, understanding its economic 
process  gives  important  policy  implications  for  which  group  to 
embrace. While the induced innovation theory has been extensively 
applied to agricultural sector, it left unexplained empirical evidences 
which  require  a  more  appropriate  model.  This  paper  explains  the 
directed  technical  change  model,  and  applies  it  to  a  hypothetical 
situation.  The directed technical change model suggests the results 
that can explain what the induced innovation theory has left out.  
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